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I suggest that this is a threat model for digital credentials, not really for decentralized identity in the broader sense. The introduction points specifically at layer 3 in the TOIP diagram, which is credential-focused. Even if we were to expand the scope to truly explore what the Federated Identity Working Group contemplates (also a potential focus suggested in the intro), I think we wouldn't be truly covering all of what decentralized identity embraces.
An example of a concrete identity problem that I suggest should be out of scope for this threat model is payments. Payments are a layer-3 concern WRT TOIP's model (despite TOIP's propensity to oversimplify that layer down to just credentials). They clearly have profound economic consequences/relevance. Payments almost always involve identity (unless we're talking about anonymous cash/CBDC), but only sometimes do they involve credentials. I don't think this threat model is really about what can go wrong in payments -- unless we're talking about credential-oriented payments.
There is nothing wrong with the narrower focus; in fact, I think it will make the document easier to write and more likely to be useful. So I am not pushing back against the effort; I'm just suggesting that the title should accurately describe the focus of the doc. The focus should be on threats related to issuer-holder-verifier-vdr model. Any exploration of identity that is not credential-oriented could be explored elsewhere.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
thanks for your message. This is a discussion we're having, this TM stems from a reflection on Layer 3 but it also tries to analyze the issue on a broader level.
One of the discussion we're having is also about whether to fork on a more specific scenario, and find a way to be able to manage threats even at the different levels at which they are identified.
I suggest that this is a threat model for digital credentials, not really for decentralized identity in the broader sense. The introduction points specifically at layer 3 in the TOIP diagram, which is credential-focused. Even if we were to expand the scope to truly explore what the Federated Identity Working Group contemplates (also a potential focus suggested in the intro), I think we wouldn't be truly covering all of what decentralized identity embraces.
An example of a concrete identity problem that I suggest should be out of scope for this threat model is payments. Payments are a layer-3 concern WRT TOIP's model (despite TOIP's propensity to oversimplify that layer down to just credentials). They clearly have profound economic consequences/relevance. Payments almost always involve identity (unless we're talking about anonymous cash/CBDC), but only sometimes do they involve credentials. I don't think this threat model is really about what can go wrong in payments -- unless we're talking about credential-oriented payments.
There is nothing wrong with the narrower focus; in fact, I think it will make the document easier to write and more likely to be useful. So I am not pushing back against the effort; I'm just suggesting that the title should accurately describe the focus of the doc. The focus should be on threats related to issuer-holder-verifier-vdr model. Any exploration of identity that is not credential-oriented could be explored elsewhere.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: